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ABSTRACT
Recent events in post-apartheid South Africa have exposed a decidedly political dimension to
mental healthcare. This was exempliﬁed in three important cases: the recent grants crisis of
the South African Social Security Agency, a court case between the state and non-
governmental organisations, and the Life Esidimeni tragedy. These events demonstrate that
despite signiﬁcant policy shifts toward basic human rights and care of people living with
mental illness, these cases demonstrate the contradictory elements of macroeconomic and
health policy exposed a neoliberal tendency towards providing public mental healthcare. In
examining these case, key features emerged, including: the commodiﬁcation of people
living with mental illness, the pertinence of auditing, accounting practices, and dynamics of
globalisation, de- and re-nationalisation. This article speaks to a tangible gap in the
discourse on mental healthcare in South Africa, by highlighting the political dimensions
that are involved under an era of neoliberalism.
Introduction
In South Africa’s post-apartheid period, mental illness and its management has become
profoundly political. This is best illustrated in by the Life Esidimeni tragedy, where more
than 144 people living with severe mental illness (PLWMI) died of negligence in a
botched de-institutionalisation process (Bornman 2017; Moseneke 2018). It exhibited –
similar to other tragedies of national signiﬁcance – a moral miscarriage on the part of
the state, where a failure to acknowledge the primacy of communal relationships of iden-
tity and solidarity, raised the likelihood of reproducing such tragedy (Metz 2017). Tragedies
of this nature occur in an age where ‘the principle of cost-beneﬁt’ (Dhar, Chakrabarti, and
Banerjee 2013, 586) has triumphed over the incommensurable values of human rights-
based relationships and processes that underwrite mental healthcare (MHC) (Lukes
2008). In low-to-middle income countries such as South Africa, these considerations
have been particularly relevant.
Rapid socio-political shifts place extraordinary demands on the mental health of popu-
lations, and low-to-middle income societies in transition have prioritised economic growth
by means of integration with global capitalism and public sector reform over mental
health service expansion (Burns 2015; Lee et al. 2015; Janse van Rensburg et al. 2018).
Despite growing global awareness of the signiﬁcance of public mental health, increased
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political lobbying for its prioritisation, and substantial research and development, the pol-
itical dimensions of MHC often remain overlooked (Janse van Rensburg 2018). In South
Africa, the nexus between socio-political and socio-economic change on the one hand,
and mental health on the other, warrant greater attention (Burns 2015). As we will
show, this is particularly salient in the governance of the well-being of people suﬀering
from serious mental and neurological conditions, who are especially vulnerable to neolib-
eral forces, despite an apparent policy and legislative environment (Makgoba 2017; Janse
van Rensburg 2018). Accordingly, in this paper we explore how serious mental and neuro-
logical conditions and MHC have been politicised in post-apartheid South Africa by focus-
ing on three key events that exemplify failing MHC under neoliberalism.
On a policy reform level, South Africa has made signiﬁcant strides towards improving
service parity and quality for people suﬀering from serious mental and neurological con-
ditions during its post-apartheid period (Petersen and Lund 2011; Gillis 2012; Janse van
Rensburg 2018; Janse van Rensburg et al. 2018). A particular pressing strategy had been
to foster collaboration across the spectrum of diﬀerent services, including state, non-
proﬁt, and private for-proﬁt service providers (Janse van Rensburg and Fourie 2016).
This has been in step with global shifts towards more holistic and balanced care (Mari
and Thornicroft 2010; Thornicroft and Tansella 2013), a sustained feature of reform
documents.
The ANC’s National Health Plan for South Africa (African National Congress 1994) called
for ‘a multisectoral and integrated approach to mental health service’, which includes the
integration of mental health services into diﬀerent sectors such as general healthcare,
welfare and education systems. It endorsed the development of multi-level inter-sectoral
structures from which MHC should be coordinated among diﬀerent government depart-
ments as well as all relevant levels of service provision. Community care and support ser-
vices for PLWMI was a prominent feature, and the document called for the ‘development
of non-governmental community-based mental health services and fostering cooperation
between the various mental health service providers’, including increased cooperation
with traditional healers. The tone of the ANC Health Plan continued into the White
Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa (South African National
Department of Health 1997), which was meant to be a roadmap for national, provincial
and district health system restructuring. It furthered the directive that health services
should be provided in an integrated manner across diﬀerent sectors, calling for collabor-
ation in care between governmental, non-governmental and private services.
More recently, collaboration between government and non-government role-players
was adopted in the Ekurhuleni Declaration on Mental Health, which was included in the
National Mental Health Policy Framework and Strategic Plan 2013–2020 (South African
National Department of Health 2013). This policy provides a roadmap for future mental
health system reform, including a focus on inter-sectoral collaboration. More speciﬁcally,
it provides for the future expansion of community MHC to formally include NGOs, volun-
tary groups and consumer organisations. Further, it underlines the responsibility of provin-
cial government to encourage diﬀerent service collaborations with NGOs. The
responsibility for MHC was taken up by the Department of Health (DoH); the absence of
voice from other state sectors such as the Department of Social Development (DoSD)
and Department of Basic Education (DoBE) cast mental illness in a clear biomedical
light. This has been profound, since such discursive power trickles down to service delivery
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levels in healthcare workers’ approaches to mental illness in biomedical ways (Petersen
2000; Campbell-Hall et al. 2010).
Key legislation was also introduced to nurture collaborative and partnership working in
MHC. Financial aspects of state and non-state mental health service collaboration were for-
malised by the introduction of the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999 (South
African Government 1999). The Mental Health Care Act (17 of 2002) allows for formal
agreements between national and provincial government with ‘any non-governmental
organisation or public or private provider of goods or services’ (Section 72) (South
African Government 2002). The National Health Act (61 of 2003) obliged the DoH to estab-
lish coordinated relationships between public and private service providers, and allowed
for formal agreements between government departments and municipalities, and ‘any
private practitioner, private health establishment or non-governmental organisation’
(Section 45) (South African Government 2004).
Key events in the governance of PLWMI
Despite these important reforms in post-apartheid South African policy and legislation,
politics have played a central part in structuring the mental health system in ways that
have negated care and support for people suﬀering from serious mental and neurological
disorders. Three events have personiﬁed the role of politics in MHC: (1) The welfare grant
distribution crisis in the South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA); (2) The court battle
between the National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental
Organisations (NAWONGO) and the Free State provincial government; and (3) The Life Esi-
dimeni tragedy. These cases certainly merit more in-depth discussions, but here we outline
salient political features that emerged in order to illustrate how politics have both been
part of shaping mental healthcare and adding to negative consequences.
The SASSA grants crisis
The South African government re-prioritised values of equity and social development by
introducing SASSA – a welfare grant distribution agency – in 2005 (Ncube, Shimeles, and
Verdier-Chouchane 2012). Falling under the governance sphere of the DoSD, it was tasked
to distribute a substantial part of the national budget to millions of people who suﬀered
under poverty, illness and disability. On 3 February 2012, SASSA gave a payment system
contract to Cash Paymaster Services (CPS), a subsidiary of Net1, an international
company trading on NASDAQ and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, in an attempt to
outsource services. In 2013, the Constitutional Court declared this arrangement legally
invalid, and ordered SASSA to either re-launch the procurement process, or to ﬁnd alterna-
tive means of welfare distribution. In 2014, SASSA submitted a plan to the Constitutional
Court to take over the payment of grants itself when the CPS contract ended on 31 March
2017. However, as the deadline of 31st loomed closer for the transfer, it became apparent
that SASSA would be unable to pay the approximately $67 million in welfare grants to 17
million welfare beneﬁciaries that include PLWMI (altogether one-third of the population).
SASSA had acknowledged its failure to meet this deadline (Maregele 2017). Given the
possible catastrophic consequences of non-payment, the Court was forced to – under
the emergency procurement conditions of the Public Finance Management Act – order
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SASSA and CPS to continue the unconstitutional arrangement that was in place before, for
another 12 months during which the matter should be resolved. Eventually, a contract was
agreed with the South African Post Oﬃce (SAPO) as partner, ﬁve months from the one year
deadline set by the Constitutional Court (Herman 2017). Importantly, the global auditing
ﬁrm KPMG signed oﬀ on reports towards supporting the CPS case during court proceed-
ings, although this was ultimately fruitless (De Wet 2017). KPMG is one of the ‘Big Four’
global auditors, providing ﬁnancial auditing, tax and advisory services to the vast majority
of public and private companies across multiple countries and multiple stock markets – its
global revenues totalled US$25.42 billion for the 2015–2016 ﬁnancial year (KPMG 2017).
Such global ﬁrms have a signiﬁcant footprint in South Africa’s MHC and welfare sector,
by its involvement in key court cases between state and non-state service providers. At
the time of writing, the North Gauteng High Court ruled that SASSA had to cede payments
through the Net1 system (in favour of SAPO), triggering a 38.5% drop in Net1’s share value
on the NASDAQ, while CPS ultimately recorded a 87% decline in value due to losing the
SASSA contract (Thamm 2019). This is in sharp contrast to CPS recording R1.1 billion
pre-tax proﬁts during 2012–2017 (De Wet 2017).
The SASSA Crisis was scathingly placed into context by Constitutional Court Judge
Johan Froneman in the opening lines of his judgement of a case between the NGO
Black Sash and the DoSD, SASSA and others (Mogoeng et al. 2017):
One of the signature achievements of our constitutional democracy is the establishment of an
inclusive and eﬀective programme of social assistance. It has had a material impact in redu-
cing poverty and inequality and in mitigating the consequences of high levels of unemploy-
ment. In so doing it has given some content to the core constitutional values of dignity,
equality and freedom. This judgment is, however, not an occasion to celebrate this achieve-
ment. To the contrary, it is necessitated by the extraordinary conduct of the Minister of
Social Development and of the South African Social Security Agency that have placed that
achievement in jeopardy. How did this come about?
A particularly important feature of this development was leanings towards building a
‘techno-ﬁnancial system’ that track and exploit the poor and socially marginalised (Torkel-
son 2017). Ways to ensure payment ﬁdelity by means of electronic tracking has been a
strong consideration of welfare grant processing, ever since its mention in the White
Paper for Social Welfare (South African Government 1997). A principal reason for
SASSA’s outsourcing of the welfare contract was to consolidate systems and authenticate
beneﬁciaries. AllPay, a major competitor for the contract, claimed that SASSA made last-
minute changes to the tender criteria, from requiring mandatory to preferential biometric
veriﬁcation – ‘proof of life’was therefore required (Torkelson 2017). Further, Net1 created a
range of subsidiaries that targeted beneﬁciaries to market loans (MoneyLine), mobile
phone cards (EasyPay Everywhere), electricity and airtime (Manje Mobile), and insurance
(SmartLife).
The NAWONGO court case
The role of NGOs in bringing the SASSA crisis to public consciousness was profound and
underlined the importance of their activist role. A section of NGOs have, however, increas-
ingly been subsumed under the state, threatening their accountability to the public as well
as their autonomy (Habib and Taylor 1999; Habib 2005). It has also signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
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their operational abilities and survival, as became apparent in a court case where a
national coalition of 92 NGOs (the National Association of Welfare Organisations and
Welfare Organisations, NAWONGO) sued the DoSD for clariﬁcation of service agreements.
The Court found that the DoSD has underfunded NGOs for services that the state is con-
stitutionally obliged to provide. It was estimated that the Free State province requires 2000
child and youth care centre beds; 1085 were available, of which only 320 were provided by
state facilities. The DoSD spent between US$354 and US$477 per month per child in state-
run child and youth care centres, but subsidised non-proﬁt, non-state child and youth care
centres US$242 per child per month. NGOs were essentially expected to provide children
in their care with three meals for less than one US dollar a day. A similar trend was found
regarding the subsidising of people requiring geriatric care (Free State High Court 2010).
In a signiﬁcant move, the DoSD contracted the services of KPMG to assist in calculating
the relative costs of ﬁnancing NGO services. During the legal process, the DoSD, with the
assistance of KPMG, drafted a policy outlining the costing and prioritising of non-proﬁt
service remuneration. The report provided the court with a mechanism with which to
determine the annual costs of providing a service to a public beneﬁciary – including
those who assist PLWMI. If an NGO provides an essential service, but cannot contribute
to its own operational costs in providing this service, the state should supplement the
deﬁcit as necessary (Wyngaard 2011). The KMPG report provided a list of options with
which the DoSD could address how funds are prioritised, such as by programme only
(including adoptions, substance abuse, etc.); by programme and responsibilities (such as
nutrition, medical care, or accommodation); and by programme and expense type (such
as beneﬁciary-related costs).
The DoSD employed a strategy that prioritised by programme as well as necessity level
(ranked as necessities, partial necessities, and non-necessities). This ranking allowed the
priority of a programme to be determined by the DoSD, after which funds from the
annual budget were allocated to programme expenses according to necessity level.
Two lists were drawn from; (1) a ranked list of 40 priority programmes (consolidated
into 34, after combining key programmes in an integrated social work service package)
and, (2) a list of expenses ranked according to necessity level. Using this method, the
DoSD avoided funding whole programmes. It was concluded that the ‘allocation model
… remains a deﬁcit-sharing model. Because the department determines the content of
each programme, in that determination it can leave out whatever it regards as non-essen-
tial’ (Free State High Court 2010). This legal process resulted in the adoption of the KPMG
model as a central technique in fund distribution to social services in the province, in
which mental illness might fall through the cracks of ranked priorities based on economic
rationality. It also swayed the power of prioritising towards the state sphere.
The Life Esidimeni tragedy
In what is now widely known as a signiﬁcant – largely political – series of events, the Life
Esidemeni tragedy was put into motion in the public sphere by the Gauteng provincial
member of the executive committee (MEC) for Health, Qedani Mahlangu, during the
2015/2016 budget vote (Mahlangu 2015a). The GDoH claimed that patients suﬀering
from mental illness needed to be deinstitutionalised to community settings, as
stipulated in the Mental Health Care Act (17 of 2002) (South African Government 2002).
196 A. JANSE VAN RENSBURG ET AL.
The well-known complexity and potential pitfalls of deinstitutionalisation in the context of
inadequate community support, having been described with exceptional depth and
breadth in existing literature as a feature of MHC reform in many countries since the
1960s (Koyanagi 2007; Morrow, Dagg, and Pederson 2008; Sheth 2009; Shen and
Snowden 2014; Thornicroft, Deb, and Henderson 2016). The more signiﬁcant reason for
the ending of the contract was a ﬁnancial one; the annual amount of US$24 million
spent on 2378 patients was argued to be excessive, and it was indicated that these
funds were to be re-prioritised (Mahlangu 2015b). This assertion was undercut by later
assessments that suggested the costs of US$22.50 per patient per day at Life Esidimeni
were below market-related healthcare costs; average healthcare costs per patient per
day at state-funded Weskoppies, Sterkfontein Cullinan Care and Rehabilitation Centre hos-
pitals were calculated at US$137.82, US$97.45 and US$104.47, respectively (Makgoba
2017). The patients were moved to 27 diﬀerent NGOs, none of which were regulated by
the DoSD. The narrative became one of shifting responsibility for PLWMI from the state
to NGOs (Janse van Rensburg et al. 2018).
In February 2017 – following an investigation by the Oﬃce of Health Standards Com-
pliance (OHSC) that was initiated by the national minister of health – 94 of the 1371
patients moved to community settings were conﬁrmed to have died due to negligence
(Makgoba 2017). MEC Qedani Mahlangu, who initiated the process, resigned (media scru-
tiny following the report has suggested a death count of more than 100). The unfolding of
these events was closely followed in media outlets, countless opinion pieces were pro-
duced which universally condemned the events as human rights abuse. The United
Nations Human Rights Council noted the following (2016):
While deinstitutionalisation is the right approach, when implemented without a plan based in
human rights that increases community-based services, and provides adequate housing and
ﬁnancial resources, it can have fatal consequences, as this situation illustrates.
While the OHSC report describes the progression of events with a fair amount of detail
(Makgoba 2017), for our purposes it will be prudent to revisit the key developments
that led to the tragedy. In June 2015, the MEC communicated her department’s deinstitu-
tionalisation plans. During the same month, the South African Society of Psychiatrists
(SASOP) warned the GDoH of the likely negative consequences that will result from the
Life Esidimeni contract termination. Despite repeated concerns raised from interest
groups, the GDoH went ahead with the planned deinstitutionalisation, and by June
2016 all state-funded patients were moved out of the Life Esidimeni facilities.
By July 2016 reports surface that patients’ families were looking for them, and that
many patients were missing after the transfer process. In August 2016, a public letter
was addressed to the MEC by Christine Nxumalo, the sister of one of the patients who
died by the NGOs negligence. On 13 September 2016, the MEC announced that 36
patients had died since relocation to NGOs, eliciting wide-spread condemnation in the
media. Two days later, the national Minister of Health requested an oﬃcial enquiry from
the OHSC into the circumstances of the deaths. Following inputs from the MEC, the
ﬁnal report was released on 1 February 2017; with deaths tolling 94 patients. On the
same day MEC Mahlangu resigned.
During the days following the release of the report, both the astounding number and
causes of deaths following the re-location process was the subject of public discourse. The
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full details of the 56-page report cannot be adequately summarised here. Succinctly, clini-
cal and other patient-level records were analysed by an eight-person expert panel; the 26
NGOs involved were investigated by means of on-site visits, inspections and interviews by
two OHSC inspectors; the investigation team reviewed popular media coverage, docu-
ments, and case presentations with aﬃdavits from civil society group Section 27, and
worked with Statistics South Africa to analyse mortality; and the Ombudsman interviewed
73 individuals under oath or aﬃrmation. The ﬁndings of the investigation entail wide-
spread condemnation of the Life Esidimeni transfer process, as well as the mental
health system as a whole. The rushed manner and consequences of the actual transfer
process was described in lurid detail (Makgoba 2017, 2):
… frail, disabled and incapacitated patients were transported in inappropriate and inhumane
modes of transport, some ‘without wheel chairs but tied with bed sheets’ to support them;
some NGOs rocked up at Life Esidimeni in open ‘bakkies’ [trucks] to fetch MHCUs [mental
healthcare users] while others chose MCHUs like an ‘auction cattle market’ … some MCHUs
were shuttled around several NGOs… [T]hese conducts were most negligent and reckless
and showed a total lack of respect for human dignity, care and human life.
The deaths of the patients received strong focus – both the manner and number – as did
the series of poor decisions and ﬂawed argumentation that led to the deaths, along with
the under-capacity of NGOs to have prevented the deaths (Makgoba 2017). At the time of
writing, arbitration proceedings were held between 134 patient families and the state,
chaired by Retired Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke. By following a public arbitra-
tion process instead of the courts, litigation was avoided towards promoting healing and
redress, much in the same manner as the historic Truth and Reconciliation hearings follow-
ing the fall of apartheid. During the public arbitration hearings, it was indicated that the
death toll rose to 144, although 59 patients were unaccounted for even though NGOs
still drew their monthly welfare grants (Bornman 2017). The process had wide partici-
pation, with prominent advocacy and professional groups taking part, including the
South African Depression and Anxiety Group (SADAG), the South African Federation for
Mental Health (SAFMH), the South African Society of Psychiatrists (SASOP), Section 27
and Legal Aid. Following 44 days of testimony and cross-examination, an agreement
was reached between the parties that included counselling for the families, a memorial,
and ﬁnancial compensation that totalled R1.2 million for each family – R20,000 for
funeral expenses, R180,000 for emotional shock and trauma, and R1 million for consti-
tutional damages (Moseneke 2018). Neither the ombud-report nor the arbitration
hearing yielded any tangible orders for system reform, and the plight of PLWMI, both
those part of Life Esidimeni and those in other parts of the country – persists.
Neoliberal undertones in governing serious mental and neurological
disorders
There are several cross-cutting political dimensions that emerge in the three events
described above. However, a prominent feature that has become increasingly telling in
the governance of people suﬀering from serious mental and neurological disorders in
post-apartheid South Africa is the consequences of neoliberal restructuring and reframing
(Janse van Rensburg 2018). Much has been written about an apparent unbridled global
growth of neoliberalism, and how it has inﬂuenced MHC in diﬀerent contexts. In many
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countries, neoliberal ideologies aided in the construction of a health policy environment
that stresses reduced public responsibility for population health; increased markets and
choice; the devolution of national health services to insurance-based systems; privatisation
of care; approaching patients as clients and replacing planning with markets; elevating
personal responsibility for health improvement; and moving from health promotion to
behaviour change (Navarro 2009). Here, we focus on South Africa’s contradictory engage-
ment with both neoliberalism and welfare expansion, against the backdrop of increased
statism; the commodiﬁcation of PLWMI; and global inﬂuences in local MHC.
Neoliberal contradictions in MHC
The neoliberal project is not path dependent and does not follow the exact same trajec-
tory in South Africa as in other countries and regions, where it has had especially vivid
repercussions. In fact, in contradiction to the traditional neoliberal trope of decreased
state power and involvement in favour of free market forces (Wacquant 2010), South
Africa has – especially during the past decade – seen increased statism in the management
of mental illness (Janse van Rensburg et al. 2018).
This statism developed against the background of a particular neoliberal macroeco-
nomic environment, embodied by the introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redis-
tribution (GEAR) plan in 1996. The exclusivity of GEAR put into motion an internecine
struggle, when the ANC had to abandon their socialist roots towards creating an environ-
ment which inhibits labour (Peet 2002), aligning with domestic and global capital and the
black bourgeoisie at the expense of the impoverished majority (Visser 2005). GEAR
exposed a nationalist drive, that united well-placed black elites with white capital (Baker
2010), that has continued under the guise of the National Development Plan. Nonetheless,
at the same time, welfare spending has increased substantially over the past decade. The
number of households receiving social assistance rose from 29.9% in 2003 to 45.5% in
2015, while government social protection spending increased by 39% from approximately
US$600 million in 2010/2011, to more than US$850 million in 2014/2015 (Statistics South
Africa 2016). While social protection policies often become gauze that hides the widening
wealth disparities and social costs of neoliberal strategising (Devereux and Solomon 2011;
Harris, Eyles, and Goudge 2016), the contradictions between embracing neoliberal policy
while at the same time expanding welfare has had a telling eﬀect on MHC.
Gillian Hart (2014) provides a ﬁtting analytical device with which to better understand
these apparent contradictory relations. Moving beyond the usual focus on neoliberalism
and its internal dynamics, Hart uses the double movement of de- and re-nationalisation
to account for the trend of increased statism. De-nationalisation refers to the engagement
of South African corporate capital with global capitalist forces following the end of apart-
heid, with capital ﬂight and wide-spread privatisation and out-sourcing of services. Its
dynamics extends to beyond the scope of GEAR, to include forged partnerships
between new black elites and white capital and the resulting inﬂuence of these partner-
ships on ANC policy, massive capital ﬂows to the global economy, and denationalisation of
conglomerates.
This was apparent both in the supportive policy environment as well as in the outsour-
cing of services by the South African state in the cases described above: the SASSA crisis
involved the contracting of biometric social grant management to a global corporation;
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KPMG being heavily involved in the prioritisation processes in the NAWONGO court case;
and, in Life Esidimeni tragedy, mental health services were outsourced to a major private
hospital group very much connected to global capital. Employing simultaneous economic,
political and cultural practices and processes that generate ‘surplus populations’, de-natio-
nalisation dynamics have deepened abject inequalities and severely negated livelihoods
of the bulk of the black South African population. However, as the Life Esidimeni and
SASSA cases suggested, the state attempted to reroute capital back into the state
sphere. In the SASSA case, this was especially telling in the awarding of the welfare
grant payment contract to SAPO (though the example is rather simplistic); the core func-
tions of the contract include managing a corporate control holding account, a special dis-
bursement account, identity card production and distribution, and enlisting of new
beneﬁciaries – all to be done under the shadow of ‘cost-eﬀectiveness’ (Herman 2017).
Further, a backdoor was provided that will allow external companies and banking
systems to assist with the delivering of some of these services, thereby facilitating a
ﬂow of capital to global networks.
The seemingly contradictory movements between statist and globalist standpoints are
crucial elements of ANC hegemony. Attempts to ‘take back services’ are processes of re-
nationalisation, heavily tied to the ANC’s post-apartheid project of ‘building a new
nation’, processes that inevitably includes contentions involving race, class, and gender
struggles in a post-colonial sense. Re-nationalisation also included the ANC government’s
immigration policies and practices that fuelled well-documented xenophobic attacks
during the past decade, as well as a broader strategy within the ANC that involves the
adoption of socialist tendencies after the fall of apartheid. The simultaneous and conﬂict-
ing processes of de- and re-nationalisation has been a key inﬂuence in the ANC’s post-
apartheid hegemony (Hart 2014).
Commodiﬁcation of serious mental illness
A key, and often overlooked, feature of MHC that emerge in the cases discussed involve an
apparent commodiﬁcation of PLWMI; the application of cost–beneﬁt, economistic and
accounting rationalities in their management; and the reach of multinational bodies
with an associated ﬂow of global capital (Miller and Rose 2008). Under the conditions of
neoliberalism ‘the inability of the human to compete in terms of productivity, eﬃciency,
and corporate values become a signal of the failure of his embedded capital or of his
ability to adequately create and cultivate capital’ (Dhar, Chakrabarti, and Banerjee 2013,
586). This sentiment is captured in responses to mental illness as featured in signiﬁcant
health policy reforms in post-apartheid South Africa, where any real advances in the fos-
tering of a nurturing environment for mental health was undone by macroeconomic shifts
that stimulated the commodiﬁcation of PLWMI (Janse van Rensburg et al. 2018).
This commodiﬁcation became apparent in the cases mentioned; PLWMI were left to the
devices of the market, where NGOs – the supposed champions of civil society and human
rights – are left to compete with each other for the stable capital income generated by
caring for this vulnerable population. The monthly SASSA payment system incentivised
quantity over quality, and the state and NGOs are embroiled in an enduring and pro-
tracted battle for the capital investment associated with the care of people on the periph-
eries on the social, political, and economic dimensions of the South African landscape. Loic
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Wacquant (2009a, 2009b, 2010) and Bernard Harcourt (2011) drew our gaze to the double
act of widespread disinvestment in the lives of certain population groups as well as invest-
ment in their management, exempliﬁed by the private prison system complex ‘managing’
(especially) black, lower socio-economic class populations for proﬁt. This entails a ﬂow of
capital from tax-payers to private companies, endorsed and supported by the state appar-
atus who are the legitimate stewards of population health and well-being. At the
minimum, PLWMI are denied basic social and healthcare, much like many other people
in South Africa. However, it is no longer is a question about quality of care and human
rights, but rather of life and death, where 144 people have died as a direct result of an
almost extreme expression of biopower, and where ‘death and freedom are irrevocably
interwoven’ (Mbembe 2003, 38).
Global inﬂuences on local MHC
The involvement of key global actors – notably Net1 and KPMG – in key events that shape
South Africa’s MHC for people suﬀering from serious mental and neurological conditions
have been telling in the cases described. This is a key feature of neoliberal governing,
namely increasingly blurred lines between the global and the local (Wacquant 2010).
The power of accounting practices, in part at least, by governance structures that
adhere to practices that are ‘often demanded by outside agencies, and which makes
various kinds of internal and external intervention possible’ (Power 2000, 114). The reliance
on the discipline of auditing to inform priority setting in the NAWONGO case, as well as to
support the case for Net1 to continue facilitating welfare payments, are central dimensions
of neoliberal strategising. It speaks to a shift from the power of the medical professions
such as psychiatry in public MHC, towards embracing decentralised control driven by
auditing-driven governance practices (Rose 1996).
The eﬀects of global forces on local MHC are further facilitated by increased global
ﬁnancial integration. There has been a general overall trend towards international
ﬁnancial integration, with global capital ﬂows steadily increasing from less than 7% of the
global GDP in 1998, to more than 20% in 2007 – this was led by an expansion of ﬂows
from and to more advanced economies (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011). As the SASSA
crisis demonstrated, social protection of PLWMI is very much linked to global capital
ﬂows, not only in terms of cash, but also in terms of technocratic governing and control
of speciﬁc populations by means of technologies of surveillance and auditing (Miller and
Rose 2008). This also made local mental health policy and legal processes more accessible
for global corporations, who have beneﬁted from trade liberalisation and reduced state
intervention (De Vogli 2011; Moore et al. 2011). There is a correlation between increased
healthcare commercialisation and foreign investment (Smith 2004), and South Africa’s
strong private health sector provided opportunity for the involvement of multinationals.
The result of these neoliberal inﬂuences has been – in concert with ANC politics – detrimen-
tal for the vulnerable, with signiﬁcant and growing disparities in the care for PLWMI.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the ways in which MHC has been politicised in South Africa’s
post-apartheid period. Despite the country’s measurable strides towards policy and
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legislation skewed on equity and social justice, signiﬁcant macroeconomic shifts have ren-
dered PLWMI a distinct subject of politics. Three key events exemplify this: the SASSA
grants crisis, the NAWONGO court case, and – perhaps most strikingly – the Life Esidimeni
tragedy. The three events contained core elements of the governance and management
of vulnerable populations under neoliberalism: rational conduct and reasoning, the cen-
trality of auditing and accounting practices, and the setting of speciﬁc standards for
human capital (Miller 2001; Dhar, Chakrabarti, and Banerjee 2013). Speciﬁcally, the
events suggested that the structural conditions of post-apartheid South Africa underwrote
the commodiﬁcation of PLWMI, the auditing and accounting involved in governing MHC,
all within reach of global capital. The enduring relations between the global neoliberal
project and national responses to mental illness are both real and important (Carney
2008; Teghtsoonian 2009).
Nonetheless, this does not mean that South Africa turned into a ‘hollow state’, where
state power is completely dispersed throughout a third party network (Millward and
Provan 2000). Instead, ANC politics have resulted in processes of de- and re-nationalisa-
tion, where contradicting movements have taken place between strategies of statism
and globalisation – this was evident both in ANC policy, as well as in the attempts by
the state to consolidate its power in health and welfare sectors.
Finally, this paper moved away from analyses of failures in governing MHC that focus on
individual culpability and negligence, towards interrogating the relational and structural
conditions that make tragedies like Life Esidimeni possible. This certainly does not
absolve individual wrong-doing, nor do we argue that agency is irrelevant. Rather, we
argue for more nuanced analyses of the governance of MHC, and more compelling
insights that engage with the deeper mechanisms of causality. Events such as the
SASSA crisis, the NAWONGO court case, and the Life Esidimeni tragedy indicate a
deeper malaise, made possible in South Africa’s post-apartheid landscape despite
robust policy and legislation. Such events are both discursive and illuminating, drawing
a gaze to the subtler forms of power – ‘a small burning candle may be the most visible
object in a closed room, until sunlight pours into the windows’ (McCubbin 1998, 97). Ulti-
mately, while these events shed light on the plight of PLWMI, the conditions that make
their suﬀering possible remain, calling for radical intervention.
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